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Abstract—Crowd dynamics have important applications in
evacuation management systems relevant to organizing safer
large scale gatherings. For crowd safety, it is very important
to study the evolution of potential crowd behaviours by sim-
ulating the crowd evacuation process. Planning crowd control
tasks via studying the impact of crowd behavioural evolution
towards evacuation simulation could mitigate the possibility of
crowd disasters that may happen. During a typical emergency
evacuation scenario, conflict among agents occurs when agents
intend to move to the same location as a result of the interaction
of agents within their nearest neighbours. The effect of the
agent response towards their neighbourhood is vital in order to
understand the effect of variation of crowd behaviours towards
the whole environment. In this work, we model crowd motion
subject to exit congestion under uncertainty conditions in a
continuous space via computer simulations. We model best-
response, risk-seeking, risk-averse and risk-neutral behaviours
of agents via certain game theory notions. We perform computer
simulations with heterogeneous populations in order to study the
effect of the evolution of agent behaviours towards egress flow
under threat conditions. Our simulation results show the relation
between the local crowd pressure and the number of injured
agents. We observe that when the proportion of agents in a
population of risk-seeking agents is increased, the average crowd
pressure, average local density and the number of injured agents
get increased. Besides that, based on our simulation results, we
can infer that crowd disaster could be prevented if the agent
population are full of risk-averse and risk-neutral agents despite
circumstances that lead to threat consequences.
Index Terms—Simulation of dynamic systems; Multi-agent
systems; Agent-based models; Dynamic games.
I. INTRODUCTION
No doubt, there are many positive effects when people
congregate together. However, there are also several negative
outcomes when the density of people grows too high, such
as crowd disasters, severe traffic delays, and pollution. Fur-
ther, densely populated areas could also lead to emergency
evacuation where people attempt to move away immediately
from the threat place due to the proximity of people and
their frequent interactions. Emergency evacuation could also
happen due to natural disasters, fire, traffic accidents, building
structural failure and so on.
The prevailing evacuation management systems depend
mainly on human power to assist the evacuees during an
emergency evacuation scenario. Although the organisers of
large gatherings might have done the necessary preparation,
it is difficult to anticipate the behaviours of a crowd during an
event that may lead to a possible crowd disaster. Uncertainty
issues such as the lack of information of other agents’ ac-
tions, location, the severity of the emergency evacuation, and
the safer evacuation exits during evacuation scenarios could
add complexities to the evacuation management tasks [26].
Evacuation simulation of crowd dynamics [4], [38] have im-
portant applications in evacuation management system relevant
to organizing safer large scale gatherings. Crowd dynamic
models has been classified into different types depending
upon how the scheme treats the pedestrians and the level of
detail of the models, viz. macroscopic models, mesoscopic
models and microscopic models. Macroscopic models [5],
[23], [24] consolidate the whole crowd as a single entity, while
mesoscopic models [12], [19], [21], [29] obtain general view
of the crowd movement by separating the crowd into different
small groups.
Macroscopic and mesoscopic models shrug off the im-
portance of the behaviours and characteristics of individual
agents where individual agents are considered as irrelevant
to the movement of the whole crowd. Microscopic model
is considered as a complex system [15] that involves both
physical laws and each agent’s characteristic in a crowd [33].
Through microscopic models, each agent’s behaviours can be
simulated and the consequences of emergent behaviours of
the whole crowd can be observed [2]. Microscopic model is
intended to model and simulate the actions and interactions
of autonomous agents in order to examine their effects on the
whole evacuation process.
In this regard, game theoretic models prove to be efficient
for assessing the outcome of the dynamic behaviours of whole
crowd. This is because by utilizing game theory oriented evac-
uation simulations, the agents will be able to examine all of the
available options and choose the best strategy based on their
principle. However, each agents’s final payoffs will depend
on the strategies chosen by other agents. Although social
force evacuation model [10], [14] is based on behavioural
aspects as well, the underlying assumption that all agents
have homogeneous properties seems to be unrealistic. In the
2evacuation scenario, crowd is typically composed of different
types of individuals [51]. Studies on behavioral evolution of
crowd takes into account the behaviours associated with both
cooperators as well as defectors [22], [39]. In this regard, evo-
lutionary game theory can be used to elucidate this. Basically,
evolutionary game theory offers efficient computational mod-
els to make meaningful and robust decisions among interacting
agents. Besides that, evolutionary game theoretic evacuation
model have also been proven to be an effective model to study
the crowd dynamics in terms of individual interactions that are
entailed in microscopic models [9]. Consequently, in recent
years a number of evolutionary game theory oriented research
contributions have been proposed to model crowd behaviours
during evacuation scenarios [1], [3], [9], [18], [25], [35], [41],
[46]–[48], [53].
Besides that, in a n×2 (n agents, two strategies) symmetric
evacuation game as proposed in [1], [9], [18], [25], [35],
[41], [48], there are only two different strategies that can
be adopted by agents which are cooperator (C) and defector
(D). However, in reality, there can be more strategies adapted
by agents during evacuation scenarios such as evaluator and
retaliator. By convention, cooperators usually don’t fight for
attaining the desired position. In contrast, defectors tend to
be very aggressive in attaining desired position. An Evaluator
will assess the opponent in terms of size. The evaluators will
act as a cooperator if the opponent is large in size and act
as a defector if the opponent is at most equal in size. While
retaliator escalates only when the adversary escalates. When
two retaliator meets, both would act as cooperator.
Up to now, evacuation model under certainty [18], [35],
[48] and uncertainty [25] has been proposed where both
scenarios are separately considered, which is inconsistent with
reality. In contrast to previous work, we intend to study the
effect of heterogeneous population [20], [30] where agents
of uncertainty behaviours (risk seeking, risk averse and risk
neutral behaviours of agents) and certainty behaviours (best-
response agents) are combined. Evacuation simulation in the
area of uncertainty and certainty is important in order to study
the crowd behaviours during emergency scenarios.
Furthermore, Wirz et al. [49] suggested that it is crucial to
understand the behaviours and situation of the crowd. The
connection of crowd behaviours and evolution of different
types of behaviours towards escape flow remain unexplored
in previous literatures. Therefore, in this work we intend to
investigate the effect of various crowd behaviours towards
egress flow and the relationship between evolution of crowd
behaviours and the occurrences of the crowd turbulence which
is believed as potential indicators to alarm crowd disasters [6],
[13], [16], [27], [28].
II. METHODS
A. Proposed spatial evacuation model
Regarding agents’ movement in continuous space, we uti-
lized the social force model as described in [25]. Next, we
present spatial evacuation as defined in [25]. Each agent has





which depends on the distance between an agent and the exit,






which is the mean speed of the agents around the central
location r of the ith agent at time t. Agents within a skin
to skin distance of less than 80cm to agent i are considered
in Equation (2), thus, vj refers to the speed of an agent at
time t, while n refers to total number of agents around the
considered area at time t.
We perceive the crowd evacuation process as an evacuation
game that is played with the objective to reduce the evacuation
time. At each time step, the agent interact with its nearest
neighbors. All the conflicting neighboring agents are identified
and solved according to certain rules. Thus, the winners of the
conflicts and the agents who are not involved in conflicts with
their neighboring agents move to their desired positions. The
simulation ends when all the agents have finally evacuated the
room.
In order to solve the conflicting agents, at first we need
to find the conflicting neighbors. The proposed neighborhood
rules in [25] have been utilized in this work. Then, taking into
account the interaction of neighboring agents between i and
ic (ic are the agents other than i in the scenario (analogous
to the complement of i)), the mean estimated evacuation time







where nic refers to the number of neighboring agents for i. In
cases where the neighboring agents tend to interact with each
other, we need to solve the conflicts so that only one winner
will be able to move. The winner can overtake other agents
and reach the desired position and gain the utility by reducing
his estimated evacuation time by ∆t, while the loser(s) will
remain in the current location and lose the utility where the
loser’s estimated evacuation time will increase by the same
quantity ∆t. As a result, the cost of each winner agent will
get reduced to an utility that amounts to ∆u(Ti(ic)) and the
cost of each looser agent(s) increases by the same amount.
For each step taken by an agent, the distance di between
the agent and the exit eventually gets reduced by ∆d which
is defined as ∆d = ‖v(r, t)‖ × ∆t where ‖v(r, t)‖ is the
local speed of an agent i as defined in Equation (2). ∆t is
assumed to be a constant value of 0.8s as proposed in [25].
Then, we define the difference in estimated evacuation time of






|v0i | refers to the preferred speed of an agent. When there
is an empty space available, the winner of the conflicts will
try his best to utilize his preferred speed in order to move to
that empty space. This justifies the fact that we have deployed
the preferred speed instead of the local speed of an agent in
calculating the cost function ∆u(Ti(ic)).
Compared to work in [25], in this work, a new n × 4 (n
agents, four strategies) symmetric evacuation game is proposed
3which consists of proposed strategies viz., cooperator (C),
defector (D), evaluator (E) and retaliator (R). Previous works
have assumed that payoff of an agent are not influenced
by the size of the opponent(s). However, in reality, size of
the opponent(s) indeed influences the payoffs that have been
received by the conflicting agents. For example, when two
defectors are competing to move to a desired position, the
larger and mightier agent will usually be able to dominate
move towards the target, while the smaller agent usually will
not be able to do so. For simplicity the larger and mightier
agent(s) will be simply referred to as larger agents in the rest
of the discussions. Here, large opponent(s) for current agent
i is set if the center of mass distance between agents i and
ic is less than or equal to 2cm, di(ic) ≤ 2cm. While equal
opponent(s) for current agent i is set if −2cm < di(ic) < 2cm.
Thus, large opponents(s) for current agent i is about 10kg and
more, while, equal opponent(s) for current agent i is between
−10kg and 10kg (these values obtained by using equation
mass of an agent as described in [25]). If no large opponent
and equal opponent for current agent i, then it indicates that
agent i is the largest from among the conflicting agents.
Besides that, the conflicting neighbours will also face a
conflict cost which could be attributed due to some energy loss,
the possibility of getting injuries, time delay in movements,
loosing some favourable positions in the pedestrian space and
so on. When the conflicting neighbours (especially in the
case where the conflicting neighbours consist of at least two
defectors) attempt to push with each other in order to move,
there will be a little delay in time. In this proposed work,
conflict cost is denoted by the time delay td where td > 0.
Then, we can define the rules that will enable us to decide the
winner of the conflicts as follows:
(1) For the case of a conflict with ndef defectors and ncoop
cooperator(s) where ndef > 1, ncoop ≥ 0:
(1.1) When large defector, Lndef is single, the large
defector will be able to move while all the other
defectors and cooperators will remain at the same
location. The payoff for the large defector is to
gain the utility by reducing the cost of ∆u(Ti(ic)).
Whereas, the payoff for the other defectors and
cooperator(s) is to loose the utility by penalizing
the cost to −∆u(Ti(ic)).
(1.2) When the number of large defectors are more than
one, the large defectors will try and deliberately
rush in order to move towards the target. As a
result of this conflict one of the large defectors will
be able to move while the rest of the defector(s)
and all the cooperators would remain at the same
location. Due to the equiprobable chance available
in getting to the next move by the large defectors,
the payoff for the large defectors is to gain the




that, the large defectors will face a conflict cost
which is denoted by the time delay td. When the
large defectors try and push with each other in
order to move, there will be a little delay in time.
Thus, the payoff for the large defectors is to gain




. While the payoff for the other defectors and
cooperator(s) is to lose the utility by increasing
the cost of −∆u(Ti(ic)).
(1.3) When there is no large defector, the defectors will
try and push in order to move. As a result of
this conflict one of the defectors will be able to
move while the rest of the defector(s) and all the
cooperators would remain at the same location. The
payoff for the defectors is to gain the utility by
reducing the cost of
∆u(Ti(ic))
ndef
− td . While the
payoff for the cooperator(s) is to lose the utility by
increasing the cost of −∆u(Ti(ic)).
(2) For the case of a conflict with ncoop cooperators,
ncoop ≥ 1 and one defector, the defector will be able to
move while all the cooperators will remain at the same
location. The payoff for the defector is to gain the utility
by reducing the cost of ∆u(Ti(ic)). Whereas, the payoff
for the cooperator(s) is to loose the utility by penalizing
the cost to −∆u(Ti(ic)).
(3) For the case of a conflict with ncoop cooperators,
ncoop > 1 and no defector, no winner is selected.
Even though there are no winner and loser, the payoff
is set equal to all cooperators as the conflicting agents
will move together with the crowd based on the social
force model. Therefore, the payoff for the cooperators is




The overall rules in order to decide the winner of the
conflicts as described above can be summarized as furnished
in Algorithm 1.
Based on the aforementioned assertions in Algorithm 1, a
new n×4 game matrix is built as shown in Table I. The payoff
shown in Table I accounts only for the row wise agents since
all the other agents will get an identical payoff for similar type
of interactions. When a strategy is chosen by the agents in the
row, the payoff received for the concerned agent is given in
the corresponding cell of the matrix.
B. Proposed updating strategies
Each agent intends to play the aforementioned game with its
nearest neighbors except the agents who are behind. Parallel
update scheme [42] is utilized where strategies of all agents
are updated simultaneously. However, here we assume that
agents update their strategies for each taken step which is 0.8s.
We study four types of agent behaviours viz., best-response,
risk-seeking, risk-averse and risk-neutral. Under uncertainty
conditions, risk-seeking, risk-averse and risk-neutral agents are
considered where these type of agents has been discussed in
[25]. While, under certainty conditions, best-response agent is
considered. In the context of an evacuation scenario, certainty
condition refers to the ability of agents to respond by observing
other agents’ strategies in their neighbourhood during previous
instances. Hence, best-response agents are myopic since they
do not consider the future or far back strategies of other agents
in their neighbourhood [18], [48].
Here, a strategy of an agent i is considered as best response

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Algorithm 1 Algorithm to decide the winner of the conflicts
for the proposed automated spatial evacuation model
Identify strategy of current agent as defector or cooperator
Identify total number of defectors, number of large and
equal defectors, and cooperators available in the neighbour-
hood of the current agent
Case based on number of defectors, large and equal defec-
tors and cooperators
if number of defectors > one and number of cooperators ≥
zero then
if number of large defector = one then
The large defector will be able to move while the rest
of the defector(s) and all the cooperators would remain
at the same location
Payoff for the large defector ← ∆u(Ti(ic))− td
Payoff for defectors ← −∆u(Ti(ic))− td
Payoff for cooperators ← −∆u(Ti(ic))
else if number of large defectors > one then
One of the large defectors will be able to move while
the rest of the defector(s) and all the cooperators would
remain at the same location




Payoff for defectors ← −∆u(Ti(ic))− td
Payoff for cooperators ← −∆u(Ti(ic))
else if number of large defector = zero then
One of the defectors will be able to move while the
rest of the defector(s) and all the cooperators would
remain at the same location




Payoff for cooperators ← −∆u(Ti(ic))
end if
else if number of defector = one and number of cooperators
≥ one then
The single defector will be able to move while all the
cooperators will remain at the same location
Payoff for defectors ← ∆u(Ti(ic))
Payoff for cooperators ← −∆u(Ti(ic))
else if number of defector = zero and number of cooperators
> one then
No winner and loser, the payoff is set equal to all
cooperators as the conflicting agents will move together
with the crowd based on the social force model




every other strategies of this agent against any other action
of other agents ic on previous period (t − 1) as defined in




refers to strategy of other conflicting agents,


















In this proposed automated evacuation model, agents update
their preferred speed based on the Available Safe Egress
Time (TASET ) and the Required Safe Egress Time (TRSET ).
5The TASET is the amount of time that elapses between the
beginning of an emergency evacuation and the development of
untenable conditions. While, the TRSET is the amount of time
(also measured from the beginning of emergency evacuation)
required for agents to safely evacuate. Here, TASET is mod-
elled using Equation 4. In Equation 4, TASETo refers to the to-
tal available safe egress time at the beginning of the emergency
evacuation, while, Telapsed refers to the total time elapsed
since the beginning of the emergency evacuation. TRSET has
been modelled in a new way as furnished in Equation 5. In
Equation 5, Ti refers to the agent’s estimated evacuation time
and TiREQ refers to agent’s estimated evacuation time due to
the total agents in front of the current agent i. TiREQ is defined
as in Equation 6, where ni refers to total number of agents
in front of the current agent i up to the exit, while β refers
to the current flow at the exit door which means number of
agents evacuated in a second. We assume that if no exit flow
at the current period of a second, then the agents’ estimated
evacuation time depends on their speed and distance only as
defined in Equation 1. Thus, TiREQ is assumed to be 0 if
there is no exit flow at that particular second as modelled in
Equation 6.
TASET = TASETo − Telapsed (4)
TRSET = Ti + TiREQ (5)
TiREQ =
{
ni/β, if β > 0
0, if β = 0
(6)
Previous works [18], [31], [34], [40], [48], [52] in crowd
evacuation simulation lack to relate between available safe
egress time TASET and agents’ preferred speed, which is not
fully realistic. In reality, agents will increase their preferred
speed when they are in risky conditions where the required
safe egress time TRSET is quite low compared to the available
safe egress time TASET . In order to achieve realistic crowd
evacuation simulation, we propose a new speed parameter,
r which will be multiplied with preferred speed whenever
TRSET is more than 0.8 × TASET which intends to indicate
high risk for the agents as modelled in Equation 7. In this
Equation 7, preferred speed of agents is assumed to be
1.34m/s because this value is considered as the approximate
mean value of the comfort walking speed for agents as
specified in [11], [52]. Agents will try their best in order to
reach a safe place prior to facing a worst condition, thus agents
will exert themselves to reach the safer place by updating their
preferred speed. Here, we assume that the agents could be
evacuated safely if TRSET is not greater than 0.8× TASET .
|v0i | =
{




In this section, we present our computer simulations with
respect to the proposed spatial evacuation model. Here, we
examine evacuation under potential threat conditions. Thus,
we set TASETo which refers to the total available safe egress
time at the beginning of the evacuation to 60s to indicate
evacuation under threat condition. For our simulations, we
consider a rectangular room of size 18m×17m which consists
of a single door of length 1m located at the center of one of
the walls. The pedestrian room space at the range of locations
x = 18 and y = 0 to y = 17 belong to the walls and cannot
be occupied by agents except at x = 18 and y = 8 to y = 9
where the door is symmetrically located. Initially, 200 agents
are placed at random positions in the range 0 < x < 17,
1 < y < 16 at time, t = 0.
Critical conditions of the crowd can be characterised using
three main attributes, namely, density, speed and flow of the
crowd [28]. [43] has investigated the relationship between
these three characteristics in the context of large crowds and
concluded that higher density will reduce the walking speed
of the crowd and vice versa. Meanwhile, flow rate is a product
of density and speed. Johansson [28] has proposed a measure
called crowd pressure which can be seen as an early warning
sign for critical crowd situations. Crowd pressure is computed
as a product of local velocity variance and local crowd density
as furnished below:
P (~r, t) = ρ(~r, t)× V ar~r,t(~V ), (8)
where P (~r, t) is the local density measured at place ~r(x, y)
and time t and V ar~r,t(~V ) is the local velocity variance.
Johansson [28] concluded from his study of analyzing crowd
disaster in Mina at the 12th of January 2006 that only crowd
pressure and density were useful to indicate the critical crowd
conditions. Thus, in this work, we intend to study the effect
of crowd behaviours towards crowd local density and crowd
pressure.
Usually a typical crowd will be excited more to leave the
room very fast near the exit door and hence clogging will
happen near the exit door [11], [17], [31], [50]. This clogging
will affect the evacuation time, flow and pressure of the crowd
[36], [40]. Thus, we investigate the effect of crowd behaviours
towards density and crowd pressure near the exit door at the
location of x = 17 and y = 8.5 and at x = 15 and y = 8.5
which are at distance of 1m and 3m respectively from the
center of the exit door.
We perform simulations with respect to a heterogeneous
population where agents of uncertainty behaviours viz., risk-
seeking, risk-averse and risk-neutral behaviours of agents and
certainty behaviours pertaining to best-response agents are
combined in order to study the effect towards egress. For the
better comprehension of crowd dynamics during egress, we
study the density and the local crowd pressure for various
time delays caused by conflicts by repeating the simulations
for 10 runs with different random frequencies of cooperators,
defectors, evaluators and retaliators placed at random initial lo-
cations. We observe that for the aforementioned average values
for the time frame of 15s to (0.7 × TotalEscapeT ime)s a
typical crowd could form an arch-like blocking near the exit.
For each type of simulation, the number of agents with regard
to one of the behaviours has been fixed, while the number of
agents with the other three behaviours were randomly selected.
6For instance, if the number of risk-averse agents is fixed to
50 agents, the remaining 150 agents will be chosen randomly
from remaining three types of agents, viz. risk-seeking, risk-
neutral and best-response agents. Then, the average values
from 10 simulation runs will be studied as will be discussed in
the following section. Here, we have included only two sources
of randomness in the simulation model, viz. the random initial
locations, and the number of other three behaviours in each
of the simulation runs.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First of all, we set the speed parameter, r = 2 and then
followed by r = 3. The results for average crowd pressure for
the case 1m distance and that of the 3m distance from the exit
door are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively, while average
local density at 1m distance and at 3m distance from the exit
door are shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
Johansson [28] has analysed video recordings of the crowd
disaster that was encountered on January 12, 2006 at Mina
during the last day of the Hajj, where 363 pilgrims lost their
lives. The results in [28] showed that crowd turbulence started
when the local crowd pressure is more than 0.02s−2, while
crowd disaster happens when the crowd pressure is between
0.03 to 0.05s−2. Besides that, it is reported in [10], [44] that
agents are injured if the pressure acting to the agents which
is the total value of radial forces directed to them divided by
their circumference is more than 1600Nm−1.
Our simulation results shows the relation between the local
crowd pressure and number of injured agents as shown in Fig-
ures 2b and 5a, 2c and 5b and also 2d and 5c. Based on these
simulation results, we observe that agents are getting injured
when the value of local crowd pressure is more than 0.02s−2.
In terms of the behaviours of the crowd, we observe that
when the proportion of agents in a population of risk seeking
agents get increased, the average crowd pressure, average local
density and the number of agents injured increases as well
except for the crowd pressure at 1m distance from the exit door
as shown in Figure 1. Although the local density is quite high
at the 1m distance from the exit door as displayed in Figure
3, the value of the average crowd pressure at that specific
location is less than 0.02s−2. This indicates that high density
alone which means overcrowding alone cannot be utilized as
a critical crowd condition and this is in agreement with the
previous work of [28].
We also found that when the proportion of agents in a
population of risk averse and risk neutral agents increased
to 100 percent, the average crowd pressure is quite low and
very little number of injured agents even though the speed
parameter r and the conflict time delay td are set to 3 and 1.2s
respectively. Therefore, we perceive that crowd disaster could
be prevented if the agents’ population are full of risk averse
and risk neutral agents even under potential threat conditions.
Besides that, we observed that crowd pressure is high when
the speed parameter r is set to three and the conflict time delay
td gets increased to 1.2s. Even when the speed parameter r
is set to two, our results in Figure 2b indicates that when td
is increased to 1.2s, the value of average crowd pressure is
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(a) r = 2 and td = 0.5s
Frequency (%)
























(b) r = 2 and td = 1.2s
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(c) r = 3 and td = 0.5s
Frequency (%)
























(d) r = 3 and td = 1.2s
Fig. 1. The effect of different proportions of crowd behaviours towards mean
of crowd pressure about 1m from the center of the exit door.
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(a) r = 2 and td = 0.5s
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(b) r = 2 and td = 1.2s
Frequency (%)
























(c) r = 3 and td = 0.5s
Frequency (%)
























(d) r = 3 and td = 1.2s
Fig. 2. The effect of different proportions of crowd behaviours towards mean
of crowd pressure about 3m from the center of the exit door.
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(a) r = 2 and td = 0.5s
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(b) r = 2 and td = 1.2s
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(c) r = 3 and td = 0.5s
Frequency (%)

























(d) r = 3 and td = 1.2s
Fig. 3. The effect of different proportions of crowd behaviours towards mean
of crowd local density about 1m from the center of the exit door.
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(a) r = 2 and td = 0.5s
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(b) r = 2 and td = 1.2s
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(c) r = 3 and td = 0.5s
Frequency (%)

























(d) r = 3 and td = 1.2s
Fig. 4. The effect of different proportions of crowd behaviours towards mean
of crowd local density about 3m from the center of the exit door.
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(a) r = 2 and td = 1.2s
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(b) r = 3 and td = 0.5s
Frequency (%)


















(c) r = 3 and td = 1.2s
Fig. 5. The effect of different proportions of crowd behaviours towards total
injured agents.
getting more than 0.03s−2 while Figure 5a shows that there
are few agents who are prone to injuries. Thus, our results
indicate that conflict time delay can be a means also for the
occurrences of crowd accident when the available safe egress
time TASET is quite low than the required safe egress time
TRSET .
A. Simulation for the case of a Homogeneous Population
Based on the simulation results discussed above, we further
hypothesize that, increasing risk-seeking agents’ population
could lead to crowd disasters, while increasing risk-averse and
risk-neutral agents could prevent the crowd disaster. Thus, how
these behaviours of agents get evolved and how they update
9their strategies during evacuation scenarios need to addressed
as well. To empirically justify these potential issues we have
experimented computer simulations in a typical homogeneous
population where we assume that the agents’ behaviours are
unchanged throughout the simulations. This aids us to better
study on how these agents update their strategies based on
a particular mode of behaviour. Table II shows the average
equilibrium achieved by different types of behaviours for
different conflict time delays. In Table II, we assume a conflict
time delay, td = 0.5s for a low density condition, while
conflict time delay, td = 1.0s for a high density condition.
The justification is that more time delay is required for the
winning agents amidst conflicts as the density grows higher.
Based on Table II, when the density of the crowd is less, we
observe that risk-averse agents will act as cooperators half of
the time and act as defectors or evaluators during remaining
half. While, risk-neutral agents will act as a cooperators
approximately one out of five times and as defectors or
evaluators during the rest of the time. When the density grows
higher, both risk-averse agents and risk-neutral agents will
act mostly as cooperators. Thus, we perceive that in order
to prevent crowd disaster, agents should exhibit risk-averse or
risk-neutral behaviour as aforementioned.
B. Comparison with an experimental evacuation
1) The Stapelfeldt Experiments: The Stapelfeldt experi-
ments were conducted in 1986, where 100 police cadets were
grouped and evacuated [45] from a room in a chosen school
gymnasium. The experimental evacuations were conducted
through a single exit of variable width, utilising exit widths of
0.75, 0.80, 1.50 and 1.60m. The exit widths are changed by the
opening and closing of a set of double doors. The experimental
information revealed here concerns the evacuation of the
room under ordinary conditions, without the effect of threat
conditions. The dimensions of the experimental room are not
revealed, but it has been stated that the room was rectangular
in shape [8], [37], [45].
The data generated from this experiment is presented and
compared against the model of the classical social force
model [10], the social force model in [32] and our proposed
spatial evacuation model as furnished in Table III. For our
proposed spatial evacuation model, in order to indicate normal
evacuation scenario we have set the TASETo which refers
to the total available safe egress time at the beginning of
evacuation to 250s. Besides that, we have utilized dynamic
conflict time delay td in which td is updated for each agent
depending on the local crowd density (Equation 8). When
the density is about 4person/m2 walking contact among the
agents started to occur [43]; we have set td = 0.5s if the
local crowd densities less than 4person/m2. When the local
crowd density is between 4person/m2 and 5.55person/m2,
we have set the conflict time delay td = 1.0s. This is because
it is reported in [7] that possible crowd forces begin to occur
when density reaches 5.55person/m2. Thus, we chose more
conflict time delay. When local crowd density is more than
5.55person/m2, we have set td = 1.5s indicating that more
time delay is needed for the agents to be a winner of the
conflict as the density grows higher.
As can be seen in Table III, the average escape times by
using the social force model of Helbing et al. [10] and Li
et al. [32] generate significantly longer escape times than our
proposed model. Compared to experimental results, the social
force model proposed in [32] produced an average escape time
quite similar to our proposed model when the exit widths are
1.5m and 1.6m. However, when the exit widths are 0.75m
and 0.8m, Li et al.’s [32] model produced an average escape
time longer than our proposed model (Table III). These results
shows that our proposed spatial evacuation model produced
robust and relevant results since the average escape times
produced by our proposed model are quite similar to the
experimental results in [45] for all exit widths.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have systematically investigated the effect on egress
under uncertainty and certainty scenarios that could possibly
arise during emergency evacuations. In particular, we examine
the best-response, risk-seeking, risk-averse and risk-neutral
behaviours of agents (pedestrians) using the norms of a typical
evolutionary game theory approach. We have simulated evacu-
ation scenarios in a continuous space using the classical social
force model, where the impatient and patient agents have
been modeled with different individual parameter settings.
In summary, the main contributions of our research are as
follows:
(1) Systematic investigation on the effect of evolution of
crowd behaviours that are prevalent in the heterogeneous
population pertaining to critical conditions of the crowd
via evolutionary game theory oriented simulations under
potential threat conditions.
(2) Formulation of the dynamical cost function for each of
the agents with the incorporation of the size of the agents
and conflict time delay.
(3) Development of an automated spatial evacuation model.
(4) Important findings on how a typical crowd should evolve
and behave in order to prevent crowd disaster.
We have set out a framework that can be used by designers
of crowd control and evacuation systems. They will have to
re-run our model with their specific values for parameters
such as room size, repulsive force and its range, angle under
which agents are in conflict, etc. Our simulations transparently
show what kind of crowd behaviours can be expected during
various evacuation scenarios. One of the limitations of the
proposed work is we have assumed that the agents interact
only with their neighbors. It would also be interesting in future
to consider also groups of agents that act as a cluster (e.g.
families) that would surely show another behavior with respect
to each other. Another limitation of the current proposed work
is we have included only two sources of randomness in the
simulation model, viz. the random initial locations, and the
number of other three behaviours in the simulation. For future
avenues or research, we would examine the effect of random
behaviour of the crowd towards evacuation. In the near future,
we will also consider a detailed investigation of evacuation




AVERAGE STRATEGIES DURING THE EQUILIBRIUM STATE ACHIEVED BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF AGENTS’ BEHAVIOURS.
r = 2 r = 2 r = 3 r = 3
td = 0.5s td = 1.0s td = 0.5s td = 1.0s
Risk-seeking
D = 37% D = 46% D = 47% D = 48%
E = 62% E = 53% E = 52% E = 51%
C = 0% C = 0% C = 0% C = 0%
R = 1% R = 1% R = 1% R = 1%
Risk-averse
D = 16% D = 0% D = 19% D = 2%
E = 16% E = 2% E = 21% E = 2%
C = 51% C = 94% C = 42% C = 93%
R = 17% R = 4% R = 18% R = 3%
Risk-neutral
D = 34% D = 13% D = 38% D = 11%
E = 46% E = 15% E = 42% E = 13%
C = 19% C = 70% C = 19% C = 72%
R = 1% R = 2% R = 1% R = 4%
Best-response
D = 26% D = 18% D = 28% D = 19%
E = 28% E = 17% E = 28% E = 22%
C = 37% C = 62% C = 34% C = 56%
R = 9% R = 3% R = 10% R = 3%
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